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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
CAMMACK
Criminal Case No. 011500845
Appellant Case No. 20030122-CA

Argument Priority: (15)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in that it is an appeal
ln

a

criminal case not involving a first degree or capital felony.

I Hah Code

Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows:
I8SUI NO 1 Whethn <u nol Wivtv w,»s sufficient evidence to convict the
Appellant of the lessor included offense of Count I, theft, a third degree felony, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended'-'
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to convict the
Appellant of Count II, forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
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6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended?
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether or not the trial court erred in either overruling
Appellant's specific objection to irrelevant or prejudicial testimony or not adequately
instructing the jury?
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the Appellant's
motion to continue preliminary hearing to obtain counsel and whether or not
objection by the county attorney's office to Appellant's motion for continuance or
alternatively loose and prejudicial characterization of evidence at trial constituted
prosecutorial misconduct?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for a claim of sufficiency of evidence is to view the
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it in a light most
favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Caver. 814 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1991); see
also State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (1985). A jury verdict will be reversed only
if the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable" that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted. Id. at 612.
In a prosecution for theft involving assignment of a real estate sales contract,
the State must prove more than merely breach of contract but that the defendant
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exercised "unauthorized control" over the property of another for the purpose of
depriving, meaning to withhold property permanently or for so extended a period of
use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value or use

compensation; or dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely
the owner will recover, see State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1990).
In a prosecution ol lonjeiy Ihe State imisl [iiove Ihe defendant possessed
specific intent to defraud "anyone"; however, the act of signing another's name
without permission does not constitute "forgery" unless it is done with intent to
defraud. To sustain a conviction for forgery, there must be a sufficient connection
between the act of forgery and the intent to defraud. Moreover, even if a defendant
possesses intent to defraud and commits the act of signing another's name without
authority, the forgery cannot be sustained unless the act was done in the furtherance
<rl IIIHI IIIIHIIIIMI

llnih .1 \lefendant who li;is signed another's nanu without

permission, while possessing an intent to defraud that is completely unrelated to the
unauthorized signing, has not committed forgery. State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909,
UK1 m u i i i h Ann l!K)b>
For testimony to be relevant at trial, it must have a tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is a consequence to the determination of the action more
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probable or less probable than it would be without such evidence. See Rule 401,
Utah Rules of Evidence. Balancing the probative value of evidence against the
prejudicial effect it may have on the jury necessarily rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court and the determination it makes thereon should not be disturbed on
appeal unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. Gibson. 565 P.2d
783 (Utah 1977); See also State v. Pierre. 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), cert, denied,
439 U.S. 882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 58 L.Ed.2d 194 (1978). To constitute an abuse of
discretion the error must have been harmful. See State v. Larsen. 775 P.2d 415,
419 (Utah 1989). Testimony leading to evidence of prior convictions in addition to
having probative value that outweighs its prejudicial effect under Rule 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence, must comply with the requirements of Rule 404, Utah Rules of
Evidence, in that it is only admissible if offered as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or the absence of mistake or accident and
provided that upon the request by the accused that the prosecution in a criminal case
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown of the nature of any such evidence.
The prosecution has responsibility to administer justice to see that the
defendant is accorded procedural justice and to see that guilt is decided upon the
basis of sufficient evidence, see State v. Hay. 859 P.2d 1 (Utah 1993); see also
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State v. Jarrell. 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980). The prosecutor in a criminal case shall
make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of his right to,
and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity
to obtain counsel. See Rule 3.8(b) Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provisions that is dispositive to but
believes the following apply.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended)
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 3.8(b) Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case where the Appellant was
charged with theft, a second degree felony, and forgery, a third degree felony,
involving the alteration of a real estate contract which was used as the subject of an
assignment of contract (collateral assignment) that served as collateral for a loan or
investment where the Appellant received eight thousand five hundred dollars
($8,500.00) in exchange for a promise to pay nine thousand three hundred fifty
dollars ($9,350.00) in approximately sixty (60) days. The copy of the real estate
sales contract given to the assignee as collateral was not the one signed by the
purchasers of the property and reflected alterations made by the Appellant. When
Page 5 of

30

the assignee discovered that the contract he received was not the same as that
which was signed by the purchasers of the property, the assignee confronted the
Appellant who offered to exchange the altered contract with the original that had
been signed by the purchasers of the property but the assignee refused. Through
the purchase of the real estate sales contract by a third party, the assignee was paid
in excess of the amount set forth in the assignment, over eleven thousand dollars
($11,000.00). Notwithstanding, the charges of theft and forgery were pursued. A
preliminary hearing was conducted while Appellant was not represented by counsel
although Appellant had requested a continuance to obtain counsel. The State
objected to the continuance. Counsel was retained by Appellant prior to trial. At
trial, the jury found the Appellant guilty of theft, a lessor included offense, a third
degree felony, and forgery, a third degree felony. Instructions given to the jury
included a portion of the language found to be relevant from State v. Winward, 909
P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995) but should have probably included as part of the
instruction the language regarding sustaining a conviction for forgery. In other
words, the instruction should have also established the point that a sufficient
connection between the act of forgery and the intent to defraud or that the
unauthorized signing of the another's name while possessing an intent to defraud
unrelated to the unauthorized signing is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION: On or about the 5th
day of September, 2001, the Appellant was charged with Count I, theft, a second
degree felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, and Count II, forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Title
76, Chapter 6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which
resulted from circumstances involving a real estate transaction of property in Iron
County wherein the Appellant sold property to a couple from Las Vegas, Nevada
(hereinafter the "Granillos"). An exemplary or altered contract was presented to an
investor, Terry Porter (hereinafter "Porter") as collateral for an assignment of
contract by the Appellant who as seller and assignor arranged for borrowing of
money, more or less as an alternative to using a promissory note. As assignee,
Porter agreed to the arrangement and loaned Appellant eight thousand five hundred
dollars ($8,500.00). When the collateral was suspected of not being original or valid,
Appellant offered to exchange for the original and when refused arranged for a sale
of the contract to
a third party to pay back the obligation of the assignment. The third party was
Thomas Comstock (hereinafter "Comstock") of Cedar City, Utah, who ultimately
purchased the Granillo Contract for a sum in excess of the amount owed to the
assignee, who instead of receiving nine thousand three hundred fifty dollars
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($9,350.00), received in excess of eleven thousand dollars ($11,000.00). The
various transactions were concluded prior to the filing of the charges in September,
2001.
On or about the 8th day of November, 2001, the Appellant, acting on behalf of
himself, requested that the preliminary hearing, set for the 19th day of November,
2001, be continued to allow him to obtain legal counsel. On or about the 13th day of
November, 2001, the State filed its objection to Appellant's request and the trial
court denied it. The preliminary hearing was conducted while the Appellant was not
represented by counsel. See the record at page 35.
Thereafter, in March, 2002, Appellant retained the services of Michael D.
Esplin who entered his appearance and moved to continue the status conference
and trial. The motion was granted and continued a second time in April, 2002, and
ultimately set for trial on the 8th day of August, 2002.
A jury trial was conducted on that date where at some point defense counsel
objected to a question regarding why Appellant was nervous about bringing the
matter to the attention of the county attorney's office, in other words inquiring of
Porter the general state of mind of the Appellant, and the court overruled the
objection allowing Porter to testify that the Appellant was afraid he would be arrested
for his conduct in part because of his previous dealings with law enforcement. The
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court later made a record of its reason for overruling the objection and ultimately
denied the State's further questions to the Appellant regarding his failure to report
the real estate transaction where it was a condition of the Appellant's probation
agreement at the time. The jury instructions submitted included a definitional
instruction of "purpose to deprive", more or less as found in the case of State v.
Winward, 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995); however, failed to instruct as to the
requirement to sustain a conviction for forgery that it be in the furtherance of the
intention to defraud or in other words that there be a sufficient connection between
the act of forgery and the intent to defraud. Likewise, the instruction did not further
advise that possessing an intent to defraud unrelated to an unauthorized signing was
not sufficient to sustain forgery. The jury instruction was given more or less in the
form submitted and the Court gave the lessor included instruction on theft submitted
by defense counsel. The jury returned a verdict on the lessor included offense of
theft, a third degree felony, and forgery, a third degree felony. A pre-sentence
investigation report was conducted and the Appellant was later sent to undergo a
diagnostic evaluation. On or about the 23rd day of January, 2003, a judgment,
sentence, stay of execution of sentence, order of probation and commitment is
believed1 to have been filed with the Fifth Judicial District Court requiring Appellant
1

Upon receiving the record, counsel for Appellant noticed two irregularities.
The first is the judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence, order of probation
P a g e 9 of
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to serve one (1) year in the county jail, granted the privilege of work release, make
substantial payment toward restitution in his previous cases, maintain full time
employment, and give notice to the Iron County Attorney's Office of any real estate
deals at least fifteen (15) days prior to the transfer of property.
C. DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT: Based upon the jury verdict, the
Appellant was ultimately sentenced to serve one (1) year in jail with work release
and other terms and conditions including notification of the Iron County Attorney's
Office of any pending real estate transfers within fifteen (15) days prior to the transfer
of property by Appellant and came as a result of the performance of a pre-sentence
investigative report and a diagnostic evaluation. The judgment, sentence, stay of
execution of sentence, order of probation and commitment was filed on or about the
23 rd day of January, 2003, although the original appears not to be a matter of record,
a copy of the same showing the court's filing stamp is attached hereto as Exhibit A,

and commitment appears to be missing from the record. However, the document was a
part of the record at the time of the filing of the docketing statement since a copy of the
same was attached to the docketing statement. A true and correct photocopy of the
document as was attached to the docketing statement has been attached hereto which
does not bare the page number in the record but shows the date stamp for filing.
Second, State's Exhibit 6 is identified in the record collectively with the other trial
exhibits at page 165 and the transcript at trial at page 124 discusses State's Exhibit 6,
the assignment of contract, but fails to indicate whether or not the exhibit was received.
However, the exhibit list reflects State's Exhibit 6 as being received. Counsel is aware
of no other time in the trial of which a record was made where the exhibit was received
by stipulation or ruling of the trial court. Counsel is not aware if this exhibit was
submitted with the other exhibits for consideration by the jury.
Page 10 o f
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and a notice of appeal was filed on or about the 11th day of February, 2003.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about the 5th day of November, 2000, the Appellant met with Antonio
T. Granillo and Remona Granillo (hereinafter "Granillos") of Las Vegas, Nevada and
showed them a parcel of property approximately 140 acres located in Iron County,
State of Utah, see trial transcript at pages 174-75. His purpose was to sell the
property to them. The result was that the Granillos left with Appellant afivehundred
dollar ($500.00) earnest money deposit and executed a document entitled Statement
of Buyers' Costs reflecting a purchase price of thirty-five thousand dollars
($35,000.00) and an additional down payment of five hundred dollars ($500.00) to
be paid at closing. A true and correct photocopy of the Statement of Buyers' Costs
is identified in State's Exhibits 1 and 4, collectively made a part of the record at page
165.
2. The Appellant prepared a document entitled Uniform Real Estate Contract
dated the 10th day of November, 2000, acknowledging the down payment of one
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) and providing for monthly payments of three hundred
thirty-four dollars and seventy-three cents ($334.73). The same was sent to the
Granillos and it appears that they signed the contract on or about the 29th day of
December, 2000. The contract was recorded on or about the 31st day of May, 2001,
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as Entry Number 434769 in Book 752 at Page 521 to 523 in the official records of
the Iron County Recorder's Office and a photocopy of the same is attached hereto
marked as Appellant's Exhibit B, incorporated herein by this reference.
3. On or about the 11* day of November, 2000, the Appellant prepared a
second Uniform Real Estate Contract identifying the same parties, dated the 11* day
of November, 2000, describing the same parcel of property and showing monthly
payments of three hundred four dollars and ninety cents ($304.90) per month
continuing until paid in full and reflecting the parties signatures purported to be
signed on or about the 5th day of November, 2000. The same is identified as State's
Exhibit 2 collectively a part of the record at page 165 and a photocopy of the same
is attached hereto marked as Appellant's Exhibit C, incorporated herein by this
reference. Appellant's testimony at trial was that he hadfixedthe signatures of the
buyers to the contract for purposes of using the contract as collateral on a loan. See
the trial transcript at pages 179-181.
4. On or about the 21 st day of December, 2000, the Appellant executed as
assignor an agreement entitled Assignment of Contract referring to the document
identified as State's Exhibit 3 at trial and the same was executed by Porter as
assignee and was identified as State's Exhibit 6 at trial and a part of the record at
page 165, the same is incorporated herein by this reference, a true and correct
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photocopy of the same attached as Appellant's Exhibit D. Although the language of
the contract is not clear, the testimony of the Appellant and Porter at trial is
uncontroverted that the assignment of contract was intended to be a collateral
assignment for security purposes to insure the payment of a debt rather than an
absolute transfer of interest, see trial transcript at pages 141-143 and 185-186.
5. Later, Porter discovered that the contract he held was not that which was
signed by the Granillos and confronted the Appellant. See trial transcript at pages
134-138. The Appellant offered to substitute the collateral, a remedy provided under
the terms of the assignment of contract, which Porter refused.
6. Eventually, a third party, Thomas Comstock, purchased as opposed to
loaning money as was previously arranged, the Granillo Contract and in doing so the
Appellant relinquished his interest therein and Porter received fifteen thousand
dollars ($15,000.00) minus a payoff to a lien holder. See the trial transcript at pages
95-97.

The transfer of interest was made and the matter resolved prior to

commencement of criminal charges.
7. In September, 2001, the Appellant was charged with Count I, theft, a
second degree felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Count II, forgery, a third degree felony, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
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amended. See the record at page 3. The Appellant made a first appearance in
October, 2001. See the record at page 15.
8. Prior to the preliminary hearing set in November, 2001, the Appellant
requested a continuance to allow him time to secure an attorney of his choice. See
the record at page 29. The State objected to the continuance see the record at page
32.
9. The trial court denied the continuance and required the Appellant to
represent himself at preliminary hearing on or about the 19th day of November, 2001.
See the record at page 35.
10. Appellant retained the services of Michael D. Esplin and the matter was
eventually set for trial in August, 2002.
11. At some point during the jury trial defense counsel objected to a question
regarding why Appellant was nervous about bringing the matter to the attention of
the county attorney's office or law enforcement. Counsel for the Appellant objected.
The court overruled the objection and allowed Porter to respond to the question.
Porter responded that the county attorney's office was out get him or words to that
effect. See the trial transcript at page 137. The trial court later made a record of its
ruling, see the trial transcript at pages 155-158 and ultimately would not allow the
State to question Appellant about his probation agreement to notify the Iron County
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attorney's office of any pending sales. See the trial transcript at pages 209-214.
12. The trial court adopted as its own the instruction provided by counsel for
Appellant and gave as part of the definitional instruction at trial. See the trial
transcript at page 135 and compare to the record at page 102. However, the
instructions were not sufficient in instructing on the connection between the act of
forgery and the intent to defraud. There does not appear to be an instruction given
regarding any caution of evidence of prior criminal acts. The court adopted the
instruction submitted counsel for Appellant regarding the lessor included offense of
theft, a third degree felony.
13. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the lessor included offense of theft,
a third degree felony and returned a plea of guilty on Count II, forgery, a third degree
felony.
14. After undergoing a pre-sentence investigation and a diagnostic evaluation,
the Defendant was sentenced to one (1) year in jail with the privilege of work release
and requiring standard terms and conditions but including notification to the county
attorney's office of any pending real estate transfers at least fifteen (15) days prior
to the transfer. The judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence and order of
probation and commitment was filed on or about the 23rd day of January, 2003, and
appeal was filed on or about the 11th day of February, 2003.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.
After marshaling the evidence, there is no reasonable inference that supports
the jury verdict of theft which as in State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1990),
the issue concerns breach of contract involving real estate.

There was no

unauthorized control of the property of another as the Appellant either owned the
land or acknowledged it as being subject to a contract interest. Whichever form
taken, the collateral interest is valid and subject to the terms of the assignment of
contract. The parties received what they bargained for. There was no purpose to
deprive and there is no loss.
B.
After marshaling the evidence, there is no reasonable inference that supports
the jury verdict of forgery because the State failed to meet the requirements of State
v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1995) in establishing the connection
necessary to sustain a conviction that the unauthorized signing was made with the
intent to defraud and in perpetuating the fraud. The contract provided for a
substitution of collateral which the assignee chose not to utilize in enforcing the
agreement and eventually he received more than that which he contracted. The
transaction was concluded to the assignee's satisfaction before criminal charges

Page 16 of

30

were filed.
C.
The trial court erred in overruling the objection made by defense counsel
regarding the Appellants concern involving law enforcement because response to
the question opened the door to prior bad acts and the matter does not appear to
have been considered in light of the requirements of Rules 401,403 and 404, Utah
Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the trial court erred in not adequately instructing the
jury by way of a more complete instruction on forgery in light of State v. Winward,
advising of the connection needed to sustain a conviction or including a cautionary
instruction on the consideration of prior bad acts.
D.
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to continue preliminary
hearing to obtain counsel and the county attorney's objection to continuance,
together with mischaracterization of the evidence at trial constituted prosecutional
misconduct. The prosecutor has a duty to see that justice is done and to make
reasonable efforts to insure that a defendant has adequate opportunity to obtain
counsel to be present at all proceedings. The objection, under the circumstances
was unnecessary and not consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Forcing Appellant to proceed without counsel must be treated as a substantial
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violation of Appellant's constitutional right to counsel.
ARGUMENTS
A.
AFTER MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE. THE APPELLANT ASSERTS THAT
THE SAME IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT ON COUNT I, THEFT. A THIRD
DEGREE FELONY.
Where the issue on appeal deals with sufficiency of evidence, in determining
whether a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence this Court has
previously ruled in State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991) as follows:
The evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.
A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime on which he was
convicted.
See also State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141-1147 (Utah 1989). This Court has also
held in State v. Vessev. 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah App. 1998), that one challenging
the verdict must marshal the evidence and then demonstrate that it is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. The problem in the instant
case is the same as that which was recognized in State v. Burton. 800 P.2d 817
(Utah App. 1990) where one must consider the elements of theft in the context of a
real estate sales contract. A person commits a theft if he obtains or exercises
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unauthorized control of the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
As indicated in the instructions given to the jury, the deprivation must be more than
temporary and in the instant case it is not clear exactly who was deprived or what.
One inference is that theft was committed against the Granillos. However, it could
not be reasonably inferred that they were deprived of property since they took
possession of the property at the time of executing the contract which went
uncontroverted at the time of trial. Of course, their purchase of the property was
dependent upon their payments and therefore it could not be said that the Appellant
committed theft against them by selling them the property and receiving payment
thereon. Another possible inference could be that Porter was the person over whom
was exercised the unauthorized control of his property with the purpose to deprive
thereof. It is true that Porter gave the Appellant eight thousand five hundred dollars
($8,500.00) and was ultimately paid more than that which was set forth in the
assignment. In other words, Porter appears to have benefitted beyond the terms of
his agreement and therefore it is difficult to see how theft was committed against
him. One inference might be that he was also entitled to the payments during the
term of the collateral assignment. However, the testimony is uncontroverted that his
ultimate expectation was nine thousand three hundred fifty dollars ($9,350.00) as full
complete payment under the assignment. See the trial transcript at pages 141-143
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and 185-186.
The only person that did not receive what he bargained for was the Appellant.
However, it is not a reasonable inference to assume that an individual can exercise
the unauthorized control over his own property and commit a theft against himself.
Also, it should be noted that no one was deprived of their interest in the various
arrangements. The parties either received what they bargained for or chose to
pursue their interest no further by not abiding the terms of their agreement. As the
Appellant noted at trial, the matter was civil in nature and did not rise to a level
justifying criminal prosecution.
B.
AFTER MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE. THE APPELLANT ASSERTS THAT
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT ON COUNT II. FORGERY. A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY.
This Court has previously ruled in State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909 (Utah App.
1995) that the law does not conclusively presume that because a person signed the
name of another a forgery has occurred. The act of signing another's name without
permission does not constitute forgery unless it is done with the intent to defraud.
To sustain a conviction of forgery there must be a sufficient connection between the
act of forgery and the intent to defraud. Id. at page 912. See also Hendershott v.
People. 653 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo. 1982). In order to subject a person to criminal
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liability, there must be a concurrence of an unlawful act and a culpable mental state.
The court further stated that even if the Defendant possesses both an intent to
defraud and commits the act of signing another's name without authority, a forgery
conviction cannot be sustained unless the act was done in furtherance of the
intention. Stated another way, a defendant who has signed another's name without
permission, while possessing an intent to defraud that is completely unrelated to the
unauthorized signing, has not committed forgery. Id. at page 913. The essence of
that limitation is found in the factual situation in State v. Winward. It is also found in
the factual situation presented in the instant case where the forgery occurs involving
collateral documentation and not the promise to pay or the assignment itself. The
terms of the assignment allowed the assignee to receive other assurances including
other contracts. As a demonstration of the Appellant's lack of intent to defraud, the
Appellant offered to exchange the contract presumed by Porter to be deficient with
the one executed by the Granillos. Porter refused the collateral. He did so because
he was not interested in the property but only to be repaid. He ultimately was paid
beyond the terms of the assignment in essence receiving more than what he
bargained for. It is true that the Appellant altered an agreement which he used to
support his promise to repay his obligation. It is also true that he was not able to pay
the obligation at the time it became due. It could also be reasonably inferred that
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had the third party, Mr. Comstock, not purchased the contract, then Porter may have
suffered a loss. However, to acknowledge such inferences as evidence of fraud
would be to ignore the very facts of the case since the parties either received the
benefit of their bargain or more, excluding the Appellant. However, like set forth
above, it is not reasonable to infer that a proper reading of the language would allow
for a fraudulent act against one's self as the basis for the charge. There simply is
no clear victim. Moreover, there is not class of victims involved in this matter. The
charge of forgery does not work because there was simply no showing of a specific
intent to defraud. Moreover, it would be difficult to make a case of fraud on the civil
side of the action. To bring a fraud claim, a party must allege that a representation
was made concerning presently existing material facts which were false and which
the representer either knew false or made recklessly knowing that there was
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation for the purpose of
inducing another to act upon it and the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity, did in fact rely upon it and was thereby induced to act to the
parties' injury and damage.

While it is true that the document presented by

Appellant was an altered form of the real estate sales transaction involving Granillos,
the contract involving the Granillos was in fact a valid contract. Moreover, the
Appellant acted in a way to provide additional assurance when the collateral was
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called into question. Last, a fraud claim cannot be made out unless a party is in fact
injured or sustains damage.
Consequently, even civil prosecution under the facts and circumstances of the
instant case would have to fail in light of the fact that Porter received more than he
bargained for under the terms of their agreement.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO
IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY AND DID NOT ADEQUATELY
INSTRUCT THE JURY.
Our direct examination of Porter during the case in chief of the State, the
question was asked how the Appellant responded to a question from Porter about
notifying the county attorney's office. Counsel for Appellant objected. After a
discussion at side bar which included the witness, the court overruled the objection
and allowed the question which more or less opened the door to making mention of
prior criminal acts of the Appellant. See the trial transcript at page 137 . Since the
matter involved Appellant's reaction to Porter's question long after the execution of
the assignment, the question of relevancy and its probative value seems to have
been one that should have been considered by the court. Although, it is not clear
from the discussion during side bar, it seems clear from the comments made by the
court thereafter as way of explanation, see the trial transcript at page 155-59, that

Page 23 of

30

the court did not consider the matter in the context of Rule 401 as applied to Rules
403 and 404 where it might involve prior bad acts. Moreover, it does not seem to
have been allowed for the purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The
court's response suggests state of mind which might mean intent but it is not clear
just how that would apply. The Appellant's response to Porter's question about law
enforcement in contemplating whether the Appellant intended to deceive when
preparing the document some months prior seems a bit of a stretch. However,
evidence of prior crimes is presumed prejudicial and absent a valid reason for
admission of evidence other than to indicate a criminal disposition, the evidence
should be excluded.

See State v. Sanders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

Evidence is not admissible if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person
of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have committed
the crime charged. However, if evidence has relevancy to explain circumstances
surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose and that fact it may
tend to connect a defendant with another crime will not render it incompetent. See
State v.Daniels. 584 P.2d 880,882 (Utah 1978). In State v. Smith. 700 P.2d 1106,
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held that when relevant evidence is admissible
for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose, the trial judge upon request
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shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
Therefore, it is error not to give a limiting or cautionary instruction. Where the
purpose of the instruction is clear in the context of the trial, as well as the content of
the court's instructions to the jury generally, failure to include a special limiting
instruction will not constitute prejudice or error. However, there does not appear any
such clear indication of content or context in the present case. There does not
appear to have been a specific request made as a matter of record and therefore the
same may have been waived or at least the inference can reasonably be made
accordingly.
The Appellant further believes that the instruction given regarding forgery was
not sufficient in light of State v. Winward. Appellant contends that the jury should
have been instructed more specifically of the connection between the act of forgery
and the intent to defraud; particularly, instructing them that one who signs the name
of another without permission while possessing intent to defraud completely
unrelated to the unauthorized signing has not committed forgery. In light of the
inadequacy, the Appellant believes that the trial erred in its ruling and instruction.

Page 25 of

30

D.
THE TRIAL ERRED IN REQUIRING APPELLANT TO GO FORWARD WITH
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WITHOUT REPRESENTATION AND THE
STATE'S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE AS
WELL AS LOOSE AND PREJUDICIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL CONSTITUTED IS SUFFICIENT TO FIND
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
The Appellant contends that the preliminary hearing is a critical part of the
proceedings and therefore is entitled to legal representation. The Appellant
requested a continuance for the purpose of securing representation of his choice to
be present for the preliminary hearing. It was the first request made by the
Appellant. The same was denied upon the objection made by the State. Rule 3.8,
of the Rules of Professional conduct applies to prosecutors and in criminal cases
states that the prosecutor shall make reasonable efforts to assure the accused has
been advised of his right to and the procedure for obtaining counsel and has been
given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel. The basis for the objection was
given in the context of the inconvenience to witnesses which were traveling from Las
Vegas, Nevada, a distance of one hundred seventy (170) miles more or less. There
just did not seem to be any reason at this time in the proceedings to insist upon
going forward with the preliminary hearing without Appellant having the assistance
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of counsel. In State v. Jimenez, 588 P.2d 707, (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court
stated clearly that county attorneys where constitutional officers and empowered to
perform such duties as may be prescribed by the law. More recently, in State v.
Hav. 859 P.2d 1 (1993), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the prosecution's
responsibility is that of a minister of justice and not simply to advocate, which
includes the duty to see that a defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt
is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Denying the motion to continue,
effectively denying Appellant of his right to counsel of choice, a fundamental and
constitutional right can not be considered in any light other than an error of
substantial and prejudicial impact. In light of the same consideration, it is also noted
that throughout the trial, reference was made by the prosecutor to at least one of the
documents created by Appellant as being a "bogus" contract, see trial transcript
pages 151,153. Counsel for Appellant objected and the objections were sustained.
Notwithstanding, the mischaracterization in the form of the prosecuting questions
may have had a prejudicial impact upon the jury which is inconsistent with the duty
set forth in State v. Hav. to insure that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence not predisposing the issue by reckless miccharacterization. Consequently,
the Appellant asserts that the verdict should be reversed in that the evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
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entertained a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the crimes of which he was
convicted.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, Appellant, DEWEY BUD
CAMMACK, prays that relief be granted in reversing the trial court's ruling,
remanding for new trial or for such other and further relief as to this Court appears
appropriate and proper

DATED this /U day of

20^) .

U/[(^KJ

J. BRY^iJACKSON,
Attorney for Appellant Cammack

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the c^C^ day of

/{CwWwfot/

. 20<£3 .1 did

mailed a true and correct photocopy of the BRIEF OF APPELLANT CAMMACK, by
way of U.S. mail, postage fully prepaid, thereon, to the following:
SCOTT GARRETT
Page 28 o f

30

IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
97 North Main Street, Suite 1
Post Office Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0428
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
COURT OF APPEALS
450 South State Street, Suite 500
Post Office Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
DEWEY B. CAMMACK
P.O. Box 1563
Cedar City, UT 84721-1563

LAURA LEE,
Legal Secretary
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Exhibit A
Judgment and Sentence

DAVID EJDOXEY (#7506)
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
97 North Wain, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar CM , Utah 84720
Telephone!t (435)586-6694
TelecopierI: (435) 586-2737

^0
23 ?003
^C/<

9rk

IN [THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY OF
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, ORlJ)ER
OF PROBATION, and COMMITMENT

vs.

Criminal No.011500845

DEWEY B. CAMMACK,
10/13/45

Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.

The Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, having been found guilty by a jury trial of
Theft, a Tnird-Degree Felony, and Forgery, a Third-Degree Felony on June 8,2002, andjthe
above-entitled matter having been called on for sentencing on November 4,2002, in Parc|wan,
Utah, and {he above-named Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, having appeared beforp the
Court in parson together with his attorney of record, Mike Esplin, and the State of Utah bjaving
appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney David E. Doxey, and the Court
having reviewed the sentencing recommendation and having further reviewed the file in |detail
and thereaner,ha'ving heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Chief Deputy
Iron Counw Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and fnters
the following Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, add

Commitmelnt, to wit:
JUDGMENT
IT S HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
DEWEY B CAMMACK, has been convicted of Theft , a Third-Degree Felony, and Forgery, a
Third Degree Felony, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in
regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being
shown or Appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged an<jl
convicted
SENTENCE
IT S HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, and pursuant
to his con\] iction of Theft, a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of zero tjo five
(0-5) yeaq years in the Utah State Prison.
IT S FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, pay a fine in
the sum aijd amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000), plus an eighty-five percent (85%)
surcharge,! for his conviction of the offense.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, and pursuant
to his conviction of Forgery , a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of zefo to five
(0-5) years years in the Utah State Prison.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, pay |a fine in
the sum and amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000), plus an eighty-five percent (85%)|
surcharge for his conviction of the offense.

STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
ITIIS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the terms of imprisonment imp|osed and

the fines ilnposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and
complianqe with the following terms and conditions of probation.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT|IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
DEWEY t*. CAMMACK is hereby placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six (36)
months, td strictly comply with the following terms, provisions, and conditions:
1.

The Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a formal agreement provided by

the Utah department of Adult Probation and Parole, and during the period of probation spt forth
herein, shdll strictly conform with all the terms, provisions, and conditions, and the same, are
hereby mafcle a part of this Order by means of incorporation.
2.

That the Defendant shall report as ordered and required by the Court and t|he

Department of Adult Probation and Parole during the period of this probation.
3.

That the Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of thlis

probation.
4.

That the Defendant shall serve a term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a

period of dne year. The Defendant is granted the privilege of work release on the terms $nd
condition$|as set forth by the jail.
5.

That the Defendant shall make substantial payments towards his restitutio^ in this

case and hi his previous cases.
6.

That the Defendant shall pay restitution in all of his cases. In this matter, |a

restitution Rearing shall be set to determine the full amount of restitution.
7.

That the Defendant shall maintain full-time employment. The Defendants

employment shall not involve the buying and selling of real estate. The Defendant may,

however, £ell his own property through a real estate agent or an attorney.
8.

That the Defendant shall report to the County Attorney's Office all real estate

deals befcfre the transfer. Said notice shall be given by letter at leastfifteen(15) days prior to the
transfer oi* property.
9.

That the Defendant shall report as ordered by the Court for review, <*^ C ^ * * ^ ^

A/W3<>A*<.

„,„

/

COMMITMENT

TO THE $HERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, DEWEY B. CAMMACK,
and deliver him to the Iron County Jail in Cedar City, Utah, there to be kept and confined in
accordande with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentience,
Order of Probation, and Commitment.
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of January, 2003.
BY THE COURT:
^

~<r*<j&f~

J. Bnilip Eves
fistrict Court Judge
CERTIFICATE
STATE (|>F UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, (CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iifon
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of jhe
original Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and
Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. DEWEY B. CAMMACK. Criminal
No.0115(Jl0845, now on file and of record in my office.

>

WBTNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of
Utah, this dy\

day of January, 2003.

CAROLYN BULLOCH
CAROLYN BULLOCH
District Court Clerk
(

S^AL

)

DeputyDistnct Court Clerk
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Exhibit C

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT- CEDAR COURT
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE pF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
PRELIMINARY HEARING
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 011500845 FS

DEWEY fcUD CAMMACK,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

J. PHILIP EVES
November 19, 2Q01

PRESENF
Clerk:
maxmem
Prosec Utor: PAUL A BITTMENN
Deifendant
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date o birth: October 13, 1945
Video
2001-106
Tape Count: 1:57pm
Tape N limber:
CHARGE
1.

THE FT - 2nd Degree Felony

2.

FOR GERY - 3rd Degree Felony

HEARIN

This ase comes before the court for a preliminary hearinb and on
Deifendant 's Motion to Continue Preliminary Hearing. The djef endant
is present without counsel. Paul A. Bittmenn is present
represfenting the State.
Mr Cammack argues in support of his Motion to Continue. Mr
Bitt mem> argues in opposition to the Motion. Mr. Cammack pre sponds,
t denies the Motion to Continue and will proceed |wi th the
The
prelim [Lnary hearing today.
Mr. 6'pLttmenn makes an opening statement. Mr. Cammack waitves his
opening statement.
r
2:02 PM Ramona-Gramillo is sworn and testifies unjder the
TIMpi:
examination
of Mr. Bittmenn. State's Exhibits 1, 31, 4, and
direct
Page 1

Case NO: 011500845
Date:
Nov 19, 2001
5 are received by the court. The court questions Mrs. Gramillo.
Cross-examination by Mr. Cammack.
TIME: 2:14 PM Antonio Gramillo is sworn and testifies under the
direct examination of Mr. Bittmenn. Cross-examination by Mr.
Cammack. Redirect examination by Mr. Bittmenn.
Recrosp-examination by Mr. Cammack. The court questions Mr.
GramilfLo.
TIME: 2:27 PM Terry Porter is sworn and testifies under the
direct examination of Mr. Bittmenn. Cross-examination by Mr.
Cammac k. Redirect examination by Mr, Bittmenn. The court questions
Mr. Porter.
TIME: 2:44 PM Tom Comstock is sworn and testifies under the
direct examination of Mr. Bittmenn. Cross-examination by Mr.
Cammack.
Court) takes a brief recess at 3:00 p.m.
TIME: 3:13 PM Court reconvenes. All parties are present and
ready to proceed. Mr. Comstock resumes the witness stand and
continues to testify under the cross-examination of Mr. Cammack.
The court questions Mr. Comstock.
TIME: 3:26 PM Detective Mark Gower is sworn and testifies under
the direct examination of Mr. Bittmenn. State's Exhibits 2 and 6
are received by the court,
The Spate rests at 3:31 p.m. The defense has no evidence,
Mr. Bittmenn presents his closing arguments. Mr. Cammack presents
his closing arguments. Rebuttal by Mr. Bittmenn,
The court finds the evidence is sufficient to provide probable
cause J and the defendant is bound over to the District Court on
both charges in the Information,
At the request of Mr, Cammack, arraignment is set for December 10,
2001, kt 10:30 a.m.
All exhibits are returned to Mr. Bittmenn,
ARRAIGNMENT is scheduled.
Dkte: 12/10/2001
Tp.me: 10:30 a.m.
Location: DISTRICT COURT
IRON COUNTY COURTHOUSE
68 SOUTH 100 EAST
PAROWAN, UT 84761
Before Judge J. PHILIP EVES
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Exhibit B
Uniform Real Estate Contract
November 10th, 2000

WHEN tepORDED MAILTO:

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
Parties. This contract entered into this 10th day of N OV
, 20 00
, is by and
between D.|L Cammack (hereafter called the seller), whose address is P.O Box 1563 Cedar City, Utah
84721 and ANTONIO T.GRANILLO and RAMONA GRANILLO
(hereafter called the Buyer) whose address is:
(5019 HAYSTACK DRIVE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89122-6845
2. Property. Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to buy the real property located in Iron
County, St^e of Utah, described as:
(SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A")
Date of Possession.
Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buyer agrees to enter
into possession of the property on the day of 10TH
,20 00
Price and Payment. Buyer agrees to pay for the property the purchase price of
4
payable at sellers address given above, or to the Sellers order, on the following terms
$ 35,000.00
down payment, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 34,000.00
$ 1,000.00|
$334.73 per month beginning December 10th,2000 and continuing monthly
being paid |as follows:
until paid inl full, there is no penalty for early or pre-payment. All additional amounts paid shall apply directly
to the principal
Payments shall include interest at the rate of 9 % per annum on the unpaid balance
from the ddte of 11/10/00 . Any payment not made within 15 days its due date shall subject Buyer to a
late payment charge of 16% of such overdue payment, which charge must be paid before receiving credit
for the late payment.
All payments made by the Buyer shall be applied first to payment of late charges, next to Seller
due amount with interest as provided herein. Buyer may, at Buyer's option, pay amounts in excess of the
periodic payments herein provided, and such excess payments shall be applied to unpaid principal.
There shallfat no time be a penalty for excess or early payment.
5. No Waiver. If Seller accepts payments from Buyer in any amount less than or at a time later
than hereirj provided, such payment will not constitute a modification of Seller's contract.
Underlying Obligations. Seller warrants that the only underlying obligation against th
property is an obligation ion favor of
McGARRY
for the amount of frljfllBSSO tfe & *?& ° 2 and that Seller will have this balance paid in full on or prior to Buyer paying off this contract.
7. Covenant Against Liens. Except for the lien and encumbrance listed in the preceding
section, Seller covenants to keep the property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. So long as
Buyer is current hereunder, Seller agreed to keep currant the payments and obligations to which the
Buyer's interest is subordinate.
8. Risk of Loss. Prorations. All risk of loss, destruction of the property, and expenses of
insurances shall be borne by Seller until the agreed date of possession, at which time property taxes,
assessments, rents, insurance and other expenses of the property shall be prorated.
9. Taxes and Assessments.
Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments which
become dtie on the property during the life of this contract.
BK00752 PG00521-00523
0 0 4 3 4 7 6 9

PATSY CUTLER - IR0H COUNTY RECORDER
2001 MAY 31 15:34 P« FEE $14.00 BY DBJ
REQUEST: CEDAR LAND TITLE INC

Seller's Option to Discharge Obligations.
In the event Buyer shall default in the
any taxes, assessments, or other expenses of the property, the Seller may, at his option pay
payment o]
efmounts and thereafter charge the Buyer 1 1/2% interest per month for any such outstanding
any such
Seller may refuse to convey Title to the property if such amounts are outstanding at the end of
amount. o«
t.
this contra
10

11L No Waste. Buyer agrees that Buyer will neither commit or suffer to be committed any
waste, spqil, or destruction in or upon the property which would impair Seller's security.
12j. Arbitration. The Buyer and Seller intend to avoid major differences among themselves in
the conduct if this contract. The parties intend that the contract terms shall control the parties rights and
obligations herein. But as to matters of unresolved disagreement the Buyer and Seller agree to submit
their differences to determination and award to the American Arbitration Association, with arbitration to be
conducted in the State of Utah.
13. Binding Effect. This contract is binding of heirs, executors, administrators, personal
representatives, successors and assigns the respective parties hereto.
14. Buyer's Default.
Should Buyer fail to comply with the terms hereof, Seller shall give
Buyer written notice specifically setting forth the provision under which Buyer is at default. If such default
is then not|corrected Seller may select any single remedy to reclaim the property.
1Sl. Buyers Covenant Against Liens. The Buyer shall at no time during the course of this
contract, a low, or cause to be allowed encumbrance against the property, and shall assume full liability for
any such lien or encumbrance against Buyer.

16

Time of Essence.

It is expressly agreed that time is of essence in this contract.

Entire Agreement.
This contract contains the entire agreement between the parties
hereto. Arty provisions hereof not enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not affect the
validity of iny other provisions hereof.

18 Other Provisions.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their signature on the day and year first above
written.

wtw^/^.jueAL**^^
t("Buter.
ANTONIO

Date

XGRANILIONK

Buyer

RAMONA GRANILLO

Date

STATE OF OTAH ^ « ~ o ~ ^ _
ss.

0 0 4 3 4 7 6 9

BK00752 Pe00522

COUNTYORReN C J — - * ~

Onthe "vs*-^ day of -&>—__w-%- , 2 0 o o .personally appeared before me ANTONIO AND RAMONA
GRANILLO
, the Buyer and signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they
executed the same.
NOTORY PUBLIC

Commission Expires:
\oo^

•** a t i —

,

- -

f

fc^.

JO ANNA CASTILLO

,

|N0TARY PUBLIC STATE OF NEVADA!
COMMISSION NO. 00-61833-1
Comm. Expires March 24 onnd

EXHIBIT "A"
ATTACHMENT TO ANTONIO & RAMONA GRANILLO
CONTR <VCT

ALL OF THE NORTH HALF OF THE NORTH HALF OF SECTION 1,
TOWNSHIP 34 SOUTH, RANGE 17 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND
MERIDIAN. EXCLUDING THEREFROM THAT PORTION LYING
WITHIN THE EXISTING RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY.
INGRESS AND EGRESS ACCESS GRANTED VIA A MAINTAINED
ROAD ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY. POWER AND TELEPHONE LINE
ARE ALSO WITHIN THE SAID RIGHT OF WAY.

00434769
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Exhibit C
Uniform Real Estate Contract
November 11th, 2000

WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
1. Parties. This contract entered into this 11th day of N O V
, 20 00 , is-by and
between D [L. Cammack (hereafter called the seller), whose address is P.O Box 1563 Cedar City, Utah
84721 and ANTONIO T.GRANILLO and RAMONA GRANILLO
(hereafter called the Buyer) whose address is:
15019 HATSTACK DRIVE, LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89122-6845
2. Property. Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to buy the real property located in Iron
County, St^teof Utah, described as:
(SEE ATTACHMENT A)

Date of Possession.
into possession of the property on the

Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buyer agrees to enter
11TH
day of NOVEMBER
,20 00

4
Price and Payment. Buyer agrees to pay for the property the purchase price of
$ 35,000.do
payable at sellers address given above, or to the Sellers order, on the following terms
$ 1,000.0(^
down payment, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and teh balance of $
being paid las follows:
$304.90 PER MONTH BEGINNING JANUARY 11, 2000 AND CONTINUING
MONTHLY UNTIL PAID IN FULL
Payments shall include interest at the rate of 9 % per annum on the unpaid balance from the
date of 11/11/00 . Any payment not made within 15 days its due date shall subject Buyer to a late
payment charge of 16% of such overdue payment, which charge must be paid before receiving credit for
the late payment.
AHpayments made by the Buyer shall be applied first to payment of late charges, next to Seller
due amount with interest as provided herein. Buyer may, at Buyer's option, pay amounts in excess of the
periodic payments herein provided, and such excess payments shall be applied to unpaid principal.
There shall at no time be a penalty for excess or early payment.
5. No Waiver. If Seller accepts payments from Buyer in any amount less than or at a time later
than herein provided, such payment will not constitute a modification of Seller's contract.
6. Underlying Obligations. Seller warrants that the only underlying obligation against the
property is an obligation ion favor of McGARRY
for the amount of $2,122.00
and that Seller will have this balance paid in full on or prior to Buyer paying off this contract.
7. Covenant Against Liens. Except for the lien and encumbrance listed in the preceding
section, Seller covenants to keep the property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. So long as
Buyer is current hereunder, Seller agreed to keep currant the payments and obligations to which the
Buyer's interest is subordinate.
8. Risk of Loss. Prorations. All risk of loss, destruction of the property , and ej
insurances shall be borne by Seller until the agreed date of possession, at which time proper!
assessments, rents, insurance and other expenses of the property shall be prorated.
9.

Taxes and Assessments.

Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments which

D U 4 3"
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becjome due 01 the property during the life of this contract.
10. Seller's Option to Discharge Obligations.
In the event Buyer shall default in the
payjTient of any taxes, assessments, or other expenses of the property, the Seller may, at his option pay
any such amounts and thereafter charge the Buyer 1 1/2% interest per month for any such outstanding
amount. Seller may refuse to convey Title to the property if such amounts are outstanding at the end of
this contract.
11. No Waste. Buyer agrees that Buyer will neither commit or suffer to be committed any
|te,
spoil,
or destruction in or upon the property which would impair Seller's security.
waai
12. Arbitration. The Buyer and Seller intend to avoid major differences among themselves in
the :onduct if this contract. The parties intend that the contract terms shall control the parties rights and
obligations herein. But as to matters of unresolved disagreement the Buyer and Seller agree to submit
their differences to determination and award to the American Arbitration Association, with arbitration to be
conducted in the State of Utah.
13. Binding Effect. This contract is binding of heirs, executors, administrators, personal
representatives, successors and assigns the respective parties hereto.
14. Buyer's Default. Should Buyer fail to comply with the terms hereof, Seller shall give
Buyjer written notice specifically setting forth the provision under which Buyer is at default. If such default
is thjen not corrected Seller may select any single remedy to reclaim the property.
15. Buyers Covenant Against Liens. The Buyer shall at no time during the course of this
contract, allow, or cause to be allowed encumbrance against the property, and shall assume full liability for
anyjsuch lien or encumbrance against Buyer.
16. Time of Essence.

It is expressly agreed that time is of essence in this contract.

17. Entire Agreement. This contract contains the entire agreement between the parlies
hereto. Any provisions hereof not enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not affect the
validity of any other provisions hereof.
18. Other Provisions.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their signature on the day and year first above
written.
i

BIJYERS SIGNATURE / ^ X ^ / ^ ^ ^ r ^ #

SELLERS SIGNATURE

^^^^gg^^V-r^
CAMMACK

dateW'S"^^

^""S^—^

0 0 4-33

///~5

1.04-
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ATTACHMENT A

(PARCEL NUMBER 10)

ALL OF THE NORTH HALF OF

SECTION 1, TOWNSHIP 34 SOUTH, RANGE 17 WEST,
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN.

EXCEPTING

THEREFROM THAT PORTION LYING WITHIN THE
EXISTING RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY. TOGETHER
WITH AN ACCESS EASEMENT ALONG THE RAILROAD
RIGHT OF WAY FOR INGRESS AND EGRESS TO SAID
PROPERTY.

Exhibit D
Assignment of Contract
December 21st, 2000

h i R . i UMLtS - IRON COUNTY RECORDER
200.1 APR 23 0 9 : 0 4 AH FEE $18,00 BY OBJ
REDDEST; FERRY PORTER

ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT
THIS AGREEMENT, made in the City of CEDAR CITY, STATE OF UTAH", on the 21st
day of December, 2000 by and between DEWEY B. CAMMACK, P.O. BOX 1563,
CEDAR CITY, UTAH 84721 herein after referred to as ASSIGNOR, and / V * y
flot-is^
A&. •&*>* J V ^ - J *
c~al~- ^«>Vherein after referred to as
ASSIGNEE.

/

WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, under the date of 11/11/2000, DEWEY B. CAMMACK, as seller entered
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with ANTONIO T. GRANILLO and RAMONA
GRANILLO. (Said Contract and associated legal description attached hereto).
ASSIGNOR herebys sells and ASSIGNEE hereby buys this contract for the agreed
price of $8,500.00. ASSIGNOR agrees to buy back, and ASSIGNEE agrees to sell
this contract at the price of $9,350.00 on or before February 20, 2001. Should
ASSIGNOR defauti in buying this contract back as agreed, said assignor shall forfiet
all right and title in and to the contract and the accompaning land, as described.
During the term of this ASSIGNMENT the ASSIGNEE will collect the payments as
described in the contract.
NOW THEREFORE, it is mutually understood that:
1.)

The consideration for this agreement shall be the $8,500.00.

2.)
3.)
4.)

That the Assignor has duly performed all conditions of said contract.
That the contract is now in full force and the unpaid balance is $34,000.00.
That Assignor and Assignee will duly keep and observe all of the terms
and conditions of said contract.
that the Assignor personally gurantees this contract, and if default occurs by
buyer GRANILLO, Assignor will replace this contract with one of equal value.

5.)

ASSIGNOR

date

ASSIGNEE

'

d

a

t

e

"

-****-

K_^MJL6?f^00l

tf

^m**-

Notary PubHc
&
Doris R. Goodwin
186 North Main St.
Ctdar City, Utah 84720
My Committor* Expires
4-15-2004
.
Stat* of Utah
-

OO4 ^

3 1 0 4
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Exhibit E
Excerpts from Trial Transcripts

1

Q,

2

And then after that, secpndly, you had contact

by Mr, Porter; correct?

3

A*

That's correct.

4

Q.

And he said he was trying to get rid of the

5

contract; is that right?

6

he wanted to see if he could sell it at a discount or

7

whatever; is that correct?

8

A.

9

He didn't want this contract,

Well, he said if it was —

he said, "It's not

performing, so yes, I want to sell it.

10

I want to get

rid of it."

11

Q.

Okay, so he wanted to get rid of it; right?

12

A.

Right.

13

Q.

Fair to say?

14

A,

He wanted his money, is what he wanted.

15

Q.

He wanted his money.

16

A.

Everybody wants money.

17

Q.

That's —

18

isn't it?

19 !
20

Yes.

well, that's what it's all about,

Okay.

Now, isn't it true that after you had made the
contacts with the Granillos and you had made the contact

21 ' with Mr. Porter that you engineered —

by "engineered" I

22 | mean you were kind of the moving party here to arrange a
23

transaction, which -- which all the parties took part to
I:

24

resolve this issue?
I

25

A.

No.

What I i n d i c a t e d t o Mr. P o r t e r w a s ,

I
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regularly deal in real estate?
A.

Not on a regular basis but it is part of it,

Q.

Okay,

yes .

And you're familiar with how real estate
contracts work?
A.

For the most part, yes.

Q.

Okay.
And how long have you known Mr. Cammack?

A.

Twenty-five, thirty years.

Q.

Okay.
Have you considered Mr. Cammack a friend?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you recall Mr. Cammack coming to you

some time in November or December, I believe it was
November, to -- with an offer to purchase an assignment
on a real estate contract?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And after talking with him, did you

(Inaudible) that assignment contract?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Okay.

I show you what's been marked as

State's Exhibit No. 6.

Is that the document that you

and Mr. Cammack signed?
A.

It is.
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A,

No.

Q.

Would you have given him $8,500 if you knew

that you would not receive the cash (Inaudible)?
A.

No.

Q.

Now, as I understand it, you spoke with Mr.

Cammack various times after you and Mr. Comstock put it
together that your contract was no good; is that right?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

About how many times would you say you spoke

with Mr. Cammack?
A.

Oh, three to seven times.

Q.

Okay.
At any time did Mr. Cammack approach you with

the real contract?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

And what did he want to do with the

real contract?
A.

Exchange it for the one that I had.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I said that, "I'm not comfortable with this."

What did you tell Mr. Cammack?

I said, "I don't know —

I don't even know what to do at

this point."
Q.

Okay.

Did you refuse to give him back the

bogus contract?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

Did Mr- Cammack acknowledge to you that the

contract was bogus?
A.

No.

He said, "I don't understand" -- he said,

"I don't understand how you put —
what you've got here.

I don't understand

Here's the contract."

Q.

Okay, and what did you say to him?

A.

I said, "That isn't the same contract that I

Q.

Okay.

A.

I can't recall if there was anything to that.

Q.

Did Mr. Cammack ever ask you not to record

have."
Did he say anything to that?

your contract?
A.

To the best of my memory, there was a

discussion on ~- I told him I was going to —

this

contract had to be recorded and I was going to get it
recorded and he had asked that it —

and I'm not clear

on this one, I believe he had asked that I didn't record
it.
Q.

Okay.

He did ask you not to record it?

A.

I'm not clear on that.

Q.

Okay.

A.

If you can see by the recording date, I think

I don't know.

it was recorded quite a bit later, after the original
after it was assigned to me.
Q.

—

It was recorded in April.

Did you confront Mr. Cammack about the
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1

fraudulent nature of State's Exhibit No. 2?

2

A.

This one?

3

Q.

Yes.

4

A.

Yeah, I did.

5

Q.

And what did he say when you confronted him?

6

A.

That was at that point in that conversation

7

when I said that this is not -- that the Granillos had

8

indicated that they had not seen this contract and Mr.

9

Comstock was I guess finding out about it.

The

10

Granillos were not aware of this contract, they had not

11

seen it and they had produced a copy of the -- of the

12 ' contract they had signed.
13

Mr. Comstock had faxed a copy

of that to me and obviously, it was not the same

14 [ contract.
15 I dates.
16

It had different figures, it had different

And I told Dewey, I said, "This is not the

contract -- this is not -- this contract, as near as I

17 i, can tell, is not the real one."
18
19

;

Q.

What did he say?

A.

He said, "I don't understand because I have a

20

contract right here," and he had another one in his hand

21

and he said, "Here's the contract."

22

don't you give me that one."

23

says, "I'll give you this, you don't need that anymore."

I
24 '

And he says, "Why

He says, "You don't" -- he

And I says, "No, I think I better keep this

Ii

25 . one."
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Q.

Okay,
And why did you think you better keep it?

A.

My conscience just said that something was

going on here and I don't know what I should be doing.
Q.

Okay.
Did you ever encourage Mr. Cammack to go to

the authorities to make -- clear it up?
A.

I did.
MR. ESPLIN:

I'm going to object to that, Your

Honor, as relevance, what he (Inaudible).
THE COURT:

Well, I sustain any further

questions along those lines, unless you can show
relevance.

If you want to do that, approach the bench.
MR. DOXEY:

I can, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, a side bar conference was held.)
THE COURT:
objection.

You can ask the question.
MR. DOXEY:

Q.

I'm going to overrule the

Thank you*

BY MR. DOXEY:

When you encouraged Mr. Cammack

to go to the authorities, what did he tell you?
A.

He said that he couldn't do that, he didn't

feel like he could do that because the county attorney's
office was —

I can't remember the exact words, like

they're out to get me, they have my number or, you know,
like you know what they would do to me or something
page 137

along that line.
Q.

Okay.
So in the end, did you rely on Mr. Cammack's

-- when you were initially entering into the assignment
contract, did you rely on Mr. Cammack's statements and
his representations to give him $8,500?
A.

I did.

Q.

Did you rely on State's Exhibit No. 2, the

bogus contract?
A.

I did.

Q.

Did you also rely on his representations made

in the assignment of contract document?
A.

I did.

Q.

So did Mr. Cammack take money from you?

A.

He did.

Q.

And did he do that —

or would he have been

able to do that but for his misrepresentations to you?
A.

I would not have given him the money if I

didn't have collateral to do so.
Q.

Now, the defense has made a point of bringing

up how this whole thing got cleared up later, okay?

Did

you get the benefit of (Inaudible) out of this?
A.

To the best of my knowledge, I was returned

basically what was interest into the contract, plus
there was some additional monies that had to be cleared
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Q,

It was some time prior to that, wasn't it?

A.

Correct.

Q.

How long, would yoii sa^?

A.

A month.

Q.

Okay.
So you think it was prior to maybe like

December 5th or December 21st -- or excuse me, November
21st or something like that, would it be?
A.

It could have been.

Q.

And at that point, did he express to you that

he was -- that he had sold some property; is that
correct?
A.

He expressed to me that he had a contract, he

was in need of some money and was wanting to know if I'd
be willing to advance him some money if he gave me the
contract, but he was very adamant that he wanted to buy
the contract back.
Q.

Okay.

So it's fair to say that when he

negotiated with you, he expected that what would happen,
at least as far as he related to you, is that he would
be able to pay the $9,350 on February —

by February

20th of 2001 and get that contract back?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

And do you think that he was sincere in his

—

in that representation?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you think that at that point, when he -~

when you signed that agreement that he intended to -- to
pay the $9,350 back to you

(Inaudible)?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you think it was --

A.

Or else I would not have entered into the

contract.

I --

Q.

Did you believe at that point

A.

-- don't know --

Q.

—

that —

—

that -- that he was trying to cheat

you out of anything?
A.

No.

Q.

And it's true, is it not, that as the time

came, February 20, 2001, he was supposed to buy the
contract back, that he contacted or you contacted him,
there was a contact made from the two of you, do you
remember who made the contact?
A.

I did.

Q.

Okay.

And that's because you didn't want to

keep the contract; right?
A,

Correct.

Q.

As well as —

is it true also that as much as

he wanted to buy the contract back, you didn't really
care about the contract —

to keep the contract, you
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1

wanted the $9,350?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

Now, when you made that contact with him, is

4

it true that he indicated to you that he needed some

5

more time, that he wasn't able to buy it back then?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

Isn't it also true that he still advocated

8

that he wanted to buy the contract back?

9

A.

That's correct.

10

Q.

In fact, at that time, didn't he, at some

11

point then, offer titles to vehicles to you to secure

12

your obligation?

13 u

A.

Under the original assignment I was —

I did

14

not want the land where it was described to me, I've

15

never seen the land, and I had asked that there be other

16

collateral.

17

that he would put other collateral up in case I just --

18

in case he could not buy this contract back.

19
20

Q.

And at that point, Mr. Cammack had agreed

In fact, looking at Exhibit No. 6, the

assignment of contract, you have that before you?

21

A.

Correct.

22

Q.

Isn't there a portion of that document that

23

has some —

24

typewritten; correct?

25

A.

contains some -- a portion of it is

Uh-huh.
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Q.

You saw him sign thisrlojcay.
And so on State's Exhibit No. 6, you can

definitively tell the jury that that is Mr. Cammack's
signature?
A.

It is .

Q.

When Mr. Cammack told you —

and I think it

would have been that he, quote, had a contract, okay,
did you believe that it was a valid contract?
A.

Oh, yeah.

Q.

Okay.
Mr. Porter, have you ever been strung along

before?

I think that's the common word.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

When you get strung along, just because

you're getting strung along doesn't mean the person has
good intentions to pay you back, does it?
MR. ESPLIN:
THE COURT:

I object, (Inaudible) what his -Sustained.

understand what the question
MR. DOXEY:
Q.

I'm not even sure I

—

What strung long means?

BY MR. DOXEY:

What does "strung along" mean

to you, Mr. Porter?
A.

Payment hasn't come in on time, payment will

be coming in the future, work with me, or you're in
arrears and trying to get caught up.
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Q.

You can invest it

(Inaudible); right?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Is there time value of money associated with

the $8,500 you gave Mr. Cammack?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Would you have —

if Mr. Cammack would have

come to you and said, "This is a bogus contract that I
created," would you have given him the money knowing the
time value of your money?
MR. ESPLIN:

Objection, Your Honor, this has

been asked and answered on direct.

He asked if he

—

THE COURT:

That's correct.

MR. DOXEY:

I think the time value of money,

though, is a different situation, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
this case.

I'm not sure how that relates in

There hasn't been any discussion of what

happened to the money or whether it changed in value.
MR. DOXEY:

All right.

THE COURT:

So I'll

sustain the objection

without further foundation.
MR. DOXEY:

All right.

No further questions,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. ESPLIN:
THE COURT:

Any

—

No further questions, Your Honor.
Questions by the jury?

None.
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defendant and his counsel and counsel for the State are
present.
I want to take advantage of this opportunity
to make a record on the evidentiary ruling I made in the
last session where I admitted certain comments that the
defendant allegedly made to Mr* Porter over the
objection of counsel, and that was the comment relating
to his reluctance to go to authorities to clear up the
situation because he felt that they had it in for him or
they were out to get him or something along those lines.
The reason I allowed it in is because I think
it has relevance and the jury could accept it as
evidence of Mr. Cammack's state of mind, his
understanding that he might be guilty of a crime or
might have committed a crime in his activities.

If they

take it that way, then they could use that to establish
his mens rea at that time.
On the other hand, it's an ambiguous statement
and there may be other explanations for why it was made,
but I don't think I can exclude it simply because the
defendant may view it as having a different meaning.

I

think the jury gets to decide what meaning they want to
ascribe to the comment, given all the circumstances in
the case, and that's why I admitted it.
Now, if there's nothing else -page 155

MR. ESPLIN: ' I 'juSt ne6d< a record on that,
Your Honor,
THE COURT:

Go &hfcad.

MR. ESPLIN:

Well, first, my objection made at

side bar was that I think the statement requires the
defendant then to try and explain that statement and his
explanation that would involve explaining that he is
currently on probation.

This may open the door for

counsel to get in the reasons for that, which the Court
has deemed inappropriate at this point and (Inaudible)
stipulated that it is inappropriate.
THE COURT:

The --

Let me interrupt just to say, I've

ordered that he's not to introduce that in his case in
chief .
MR. ESPLIN:
THE COURT:

Right.
Now, if you're —

if the defendant

takes the stand and opens that door, he may get into it.
MR. ESPLIN:

That's why I'm objecting to the

statement, because in order to explain that statement,
he would -- his explanation that (Inaudible) that he has
the probationary agreement which prohibits him from
entering into any (Inaudible) legitimate contract
i

without notifying the county attorney's office.

And so

! his -- he will not be able to (Inaudible) jury without
i

opening that door for that -- that reason.

It certainly
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has nothing to do with the (Inaudible) concerned that
somebody's out to bother (Inaudible).
THE COURT:

Well, and I understand your

concern, Mr. Esplin, and if I were in your situation,
Ifd be just as concerned, but as I understand it, the
defendant has two rights in this case.

He has the right

to remain silent and he has the right to take the
witness stand and explain his version of the facts.

I

don't think he has the right to hide the ball from the
jury and that's why I've allowed it in.
MR. ESPLIN:

We're (Inaudible) at least as to

count -- the count concerning the contract itself,
(Inaudible) based on the evidence here, clear back in
December 21st, a (Inaudible) prior —
this statement being made.
THE COURT:
MR. ESPLIN:

somewhat prior to

And he --

You've lost me, I'm sorry.
Well, I'm talking about the

actual allegations and testimony concerning when this
contract was presented, both the contract that we're
talking about here in terms of don't go to the
authorities was presented, but then in December of the
previous year and the —

the comment at that time

(Inaudible) may not have been anything other than a

—

to obtain the loan without him trying to (Inaudible)
anybody any other thing you see.

He tells them
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(Inaudible) later on that his intent at that time was
otherwise, so leaving the danger of a comment —

the

(Inaudible) value of the comment as being (Inaudible)
effect of it.
THE COURT:
If one —

Well, I don't view it that way.

if one prepares a phony contract to obtain a

loan and then when one can't pay back the loan one

says

to the lender, "I can't go to the authorities because
they're going to prosecute me if I do," it seems to me
that indicates that way back at the beginning, when that
contract was prepared, he knew that he shouldn't be
preparing that contract, and I think the jury can
consider that.
MR. ESPLIN:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
So now, if there's nothing else,

we'll invite the jury to rejoin us, and who's your next
witness?
MR. DOXEY:

Patsy Cutler.

THE COURT:

Okay, and she's present?

MR. DOXEY:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Have a seat, folks.

The record should reflect that all the members
of the jury are back and in their places.
We appreciate your patience.

We took

advantage of your absence from the courtroom to discuss
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and he's in violation of his probation.
—

And so the jury

the probative value of that is just so minuscule

compared to the —

the present issue that it will allow

them to bring in the back door stuff they couldn't bring
in different.

In fact, there's been a previous

conviction and there's been a probation.

He's on

probation, it's a violation of his probation agreement.
MR. DOXEY:
Honor.

Well, let me address that, Your

All we need to address is that there's an

outstanding court order that Mr. Cammack report all
financial trans —

or real estate transactions to the

county attorney's office.

There is —

we do not need to

state that it's a criminal probation situation.

All we

need to know is that there's a court order that he do
that and I think —

I think we don't even need to get

into the probation.
THE WITNESS:
MR. DOXEY:
MR. ESPLIN:
Honor.

I mean

I think I've done that.
He didn't need to get into the -The jurors are not stupid, Your

—

THE .GOURT,:,^Well; -.,MR. VJESPLI,R;iMf£bu know, when they talk about
the county attbtney^tdWBBiitdce^ thev're going —

and he's

violated a court order, they're going to -- they're
going to assume that he's, on other occasions, done
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similar acts when the other occasion is

(Inaudible)

different situation.
THE COURT:
4

Let me ask this:

What

specific

question do you propose to ask?
MR. DOXEY:

5

Why he didn't report this

6

transaction to the county attorney's office as ordered

7

by the court.

8

THE COURT:

9

issues in this case?

10

MR. DOXEY:

11

THE COURT:

16

Even assuming that that's true,

how does that go to the elements of this case?
MR. DOXEY:

14
15

I think it shows his intent to

hide the whole transaction, Your Honor.

12
13

And how would that bear on the

Honor.

(Inaudible) his whole case, Your

This is whole case -THE COURT:

Well, but even if this was a

17

legitimate transaction, which he claims it was, which

18

you claim it wasn't, he had an obligation to report it.

19

MR. DOXEY:

That's right, and he didn't.

20

THE COURT:

And that would violate his

21

probation under your theory but it wouldn't make him

22

guilty of this offense.

23

THE WITNESS:

24

THE COURT:

25

I did report that.
Mr. Cammack, this is a legal

question, not for you to be involved.
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THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Okay.
You got a lawyer representing you.

So I don't quite see the relevance of that
line of inquiry.

It may be that you want to charge him

with violating his probation, if his probation -MR. DOXEY:

I don't

—

THE COURT:

-- is Still in effect.

MR. DOXEY:

You know, I might do that later,

Your Honor, but the reality is that's not why
offering it.

I'm

I'm offering it to show his criminal

intent, that he's hiding this whole transaction from our
office.
THE COURT:

What criminal intent?

Criminal

intent to do what?
MR. DOXEY:

To defraud everybody in this -- to

defraud Mr. Terry Porter, to defraud the Granillos.

Why

else would he hide it from us if it was a legitimate
transaction?
THE COURT:

Well, I don't know why he would,

MR. DOXEY:

There is no

THE COURT:

-- the issue -- the point is, Mr.

but -—

Doxey, that his failure to report it to the county
attorney's office does not in any way demonstrate that
the transaction was illegal.
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MR. DOXEY:

Iithink it does, Your Honor,

THE COURT:

Well, I' 11 disagree and I'm going

to deny the request to ask that question.
Now, are we done with that issue?

Is there

another issue we need to get to address?
MR. DOXEY:

(Inaudible) .

THE COURT:

Do you want to invite the jury

back in.
(Whereupon, the jury returns to the
courtroom.)
THE COURT:
places.

The jurors are back and in their

That wasn't too long.
Go ahead, Mr. Doxey, ask your next question.
MR. DOXEY:

Q.

Thank you, Your Honor.

BY MR. DOXEY:

Go to State's Exhibit No. 4.

You prepared this whole document; is that correct?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Okay.

You actually typed it out?

And as to State's Exhibit No. 6, did you type
that out, too?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Except for the sentence on the bottom.
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